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i \ i"HE UTAH ('OUR i' OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
;> \ '.•. \ \i.\i< !!.;;.>,• ••• •  : Case No. 20070526-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
(2002). Appellant Dawn Downs w^'/- ?; -rvJ •,• *(j ^ -.:.-.-*» •••/'• - ; .*..."•';><,,, ,.,v!!--{ 
a conh'olled substance within a correenonal facility. a second-dcgrcc-fclouy offense 
under : iaii •. uac .\n;i. s :.N-. ;; / :-.i..:); o;« iMipp. iOitj). "fhe judgment is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. K:;c *• MOV). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: WheUiCr the trial ciarri ,.s\\:d m ^diiuiuh^ c\ u-jnoc ihat was unduly 
n n : i u ' V f . - i ' . u . / o r i . ' . ! f n < . r i . l - '• - e : > - ^ . n * - '• * * •' - ' i ' . • :" ' \ !••-1-'• • ! ^ r . ^ f - u , 
Standard of Review: "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be 
either a question of" discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a question of 
lav* M. hf;h '•. 4 ' " : ^ !' ' > ' •'.'. ••'•-; '" '*tate v. Merlin. N" l : -. * ' • .i ^ ,.-,'• , 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved ID the lueord on appeal at 134:13-23. 
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 403 (2007). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On January 5, 2006, the state filed an information against Downs - that it later 
amended - charging unlawful possession of a controlled substance in a correctional 
facility, a second-degree-felony offense. (R. 2-3; 103-04). On June 8, 2006, the trial 
court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound the case over for trial. (R. 32-33). On 
March 28 and 29, 2007, the trial court conducted a jury trial in the matter, and at the 
conclusion of trial, the jury found Downs guilty as charged. (R. 156). On June 4, 2007, 
the trial court sentenced Downs to a suspended prison term and ordered her to serve 90 
days in jail followed by probation. (R. 170-72). On June 22, 2007, Downs filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R. 173). She is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented the following evidence at trial. On November 30, 2005, at 
approximately 10:30 or 11:00 at night, police executed a search warrant on a home at 
2965 South 700 East, in Salt Lake City. (R. 184:113-15, 116). According to the 
evidence, Dawn Downs and Brian Stevens lived at the address. (See R. 184:121). 
The warrant focused on Stevens. (R. 184:141). Officers were "going after a drug 
distribution operation that was going on in that house" conducted by Stevens. (R. 184: 
143 (stating that a confidential informant had dealings with Stevens)). Officers were not 
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aware at the time that Downs lived at the home. (R. 184:141-42, 145). She was not 
listed as a person of interest in the warrant. (See, e.g., R 184:142-43"). 
: /uir.ig the search, pence a^v.o\v:iV;.: .-x-vera; lUans ;. ;iio !;n;:ic, n^.iudmi: a large 
tin box with several small plastic baggies "comii. \ i - \ i **• '* v - • d :•• V . :L 
184:121; Exhibit 8); a little black container with magnets that may he used to store drugs 
on the bottom:; oi '.•.i:,.J-j, . . \. herever you wan: io :,;:cu .j^m to conceal irum i^;!i. c" 
(R. 184.121-22; see Exhibits S and PV :; small bU'\ b-- • ^ ,r\ cr.>]
 ]X\ck.\yc< <^f 
substance that field-tested positive for methamphetaminc \ R. 1 84:1 25-26 i'deseribiug the 
baggies as one-by-one or two-bvuvo; mso .mating that the K>\ was kmr^ on m.- kit.hen 
Ho'>r where Slovens was silling); Exhibits ' x } -,•!. -;•••!•:.•» - -;i(r in 
[he amoinn of Si.0(>4.. and cash in a brown wallet in the same safe in the amount of 
;>/."-* / . : - -> i^u'.iiig Uie sale vvas m a cio:.u ai Stevens's room); Exhibits 13, 
address. (R. 184:121 -22; see Exhibit 7, <)). 
Pohcc delamcd indr. niiiuis ai mc residence, mcludi;.^ Downs, Stevens and 
V ' ' - ' ^ .-^orJ S . '• - : ; - , . s_^±_uis±* K '• : • " ; indicating tl lat /:\i i.dy 
I iansen and Kelly Sietcher also were in the home M. As pa; I of iheir procedure (see R. 
i •• --.;. 4>». ih. o; iieevs nanueul U\» Iru-. i...ij\ .auiLs, frisked them for weapons, and 
processed ; '• " \ ' : i r " > = ;* ' M M ; ! ; ' . , . * J « " ! • J* : \ ' ! • • • „ ' ' • • ' ' ' ' -'' -^ !'" « " . i • ' . • • ] • - ' " : : • 
warranis. (R. 1^4:129-30, 106). The officers also administered warnings pursuant to 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 TT ^ 4?6 (1066). (R. 184:"PP 
Meieeliw l\r<-,Ke] «•• run - ! * . ns's name a;- i . -i. ^ icted a wai rants check oi i hei 
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(R. 184:167). He discovered two outstanding warrants for misdemeanor offenses, so he 
took Downs into custody and transported her to the jail. (R. 184:167-68 (stating he also 
transported Stevens and Kelly Stetcher); see also R. 184:175). 
Eatchel testified that it is his practice to ask arrestees at the jail "if they have 
anything [in their possession] that I need to know about, anything that can't go into the 
jail because if they take anything into the jail, it's an additional charge." (R. 184:168-69). 
According to Eatchel, he warned Downs about taking contraband into the jail. She did 
not indicate that she had anything illegal. (R. 184:169). Eatchel then took Downs into 
the booking area and turned her over to the jail staff. (R. 184:169). 
Christine Pugh worked in the processing area of the jail. (R. 184:155). It was her 
job to search new arrivals, and to book or process them by obtaining fingerprints and 
taking pictures. (R. 184:155, 159-60). Pugh processed Downs. (R. 184:156). She asked 
if Downs had any illegal items including weapons or contraband. (R. 184:156-57, 160). 
Downs responded that she did not. (R. 184:157). Downs remained handcuffed while 
Pugh performed an intake search by checking Downs's waistband and pockets. (R. 
184:157). Pugh discovered a baggie in the right coin pocket of Downs's pants. It 
contained a white crystalline substance. (R. 184:157-58, 170; Exhibit 15 (identifying the 
item as "8"); see also R. 184:128, 137, 178). Pugh could not recall that the baggie was 
any particular color. (R. 184:161). Downs indicated to Pugh that the baggie was not 
hers: "she didn't know where [it] came from." (R. 184:162). 
Pugh turned the baggie over to Detective Eatchel and he took it back to the house 
for processing. (R. 184:128, 158, 170; Exhibit 15). Eatchel did not note anything parti-
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cular about the item, and he did not note its size. (R. 184:179). He identified it at trial as 
90 grams of methamphetamine in a plastic bag labeled as Exhibit 18. (R. 184:173). 
Downs indicated to Eatchel that the substance did not belong to her. (R. 184:180). 
State criminalist Kevin Smith tested the substance in the baggie from the jail 
(Exhibit 18 on Exhibit List), and substances from the house. (Exhibits 19 through 24 on 
Exhibit List). According to Smith, the substances tested positive for methamphetamine. 
(R. 184:190-91 (identifying Exhibit 18 as item number 144567)). Smith testified that the 
items identified as Exhibits 18, 19, 20, and 23 were labeled as "pink." (R. 184:191). 
Also, plastic baggies for Exhibits 18 and 19 appeared to be similar, although the baggie 
for Exhibit 18 was smaller. (R. 184:193, 197). He stated that the baggies for Exhibits 18 
and 19 would not have come from the same commercial box. (R. 184:197). 
Smith described the methamphetamine in both Exhibits 18 and 19 as "off-white 
solids." (R. 184:197). Also, he maintained that the controlled substances "absolutely" 
could have come from the same source. (R. 184:198). 
Both the state and the defense presented evidence concerning Downs's activities 
on November 30. State witness Karen Larabee testified that on November 30, she went 
for a late lunch with Downs and two other women to celebrate their birthdays. (R. 
184:204 (identifying the other women as Tracy and Misty)). It was approximately 3:00 
when Karen arrived at Downs's house. (R. 184:205-06). She drove. (Id.) Downs was 
not ready, so the women drove to Thrift Town at 3300 South 1300 East. (R. 184:208-09). 
Karen purchased shirts and pants. (R. 184:210). She also had several pairs of pants in 
her car. (R. 184:211). Some of the items were for her daughter. (Id.) 
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After shopping, the women returned to Downs's house (R. 184:212), then they all 
drove to Chuck-A-Rama on 6400 South and State Street. (R. 184:212-13). It was 
approximately 4:30. (R. 184:213). As the women pulled into the parking lot, Downs 
began coughing hard (R. 184:214-15, 228), causing "an accident in her pants." (R. 
184:215). Downs wanted to go home to change her clothes; however, Karen insisted she 
put on a pair of pants that she had purchased at Thrift Town. (R. 184:215, 228). They 
found a pair that fit (R. 184:216, 230), and the women continued with their birthday 
celebration as planned. (See R. 184:219). Karen testified that after eating, she drove the 
women home and she arrived back at her house at 7:00 that evening. (R. 184:219-20). 
Downs did not return the pants that she borrowed that evening. (R. 184:232). 
Karen testified that she used to work at Thrift Town. (R. 184:209). Thrift Town 
is a thrift shop; her duties as an employee included sorting through clothing and checking 
for spots, tossing rejected items, and placing items for resale on hangers. (R. 184:218). 
Karen testified that when clothes came to Thrift Town for resale, employees would not 
necessarily go through the pockets. (R. 184:218-19). "We didn't have time to do that." 
Items moved by quickly on a conveyor belt. (R. 184:219; see also 184:230-31 (some 
items were washed; some items were not)). 
Karen testified that when she went through the pockets of clothing at Thrift Town, 
she found "a rubber," tissue, and "$10 once." (R. 184:219). Karen's daughter also "found 
a rubber in one of her pair of pants. I've been shopping there and I always find stuff in 
the pants pockets." (R. 184:219). 
The defense called Misty Clarke to testify to the events of November 30. She 
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stated that she spent the morning with Downs helping her clean. (R. 185:250). The 
women then planned to meet others for a late birthday lunch. (R. 185:250-51). When the 
others arrived, Downs was not ready, so Misty went shopping with the women at Thrift 
Town. (R. 185:251, 262-63). Misty testified that Karen bought pants, then the women 
returned to pickup Downs and continued on to Chuck-A-Rama where Downs "ended up 
having a cough attack in the car and she peed her pants." (R. 185:251-52). Karen offered 
Downs a pair of pants, and after dinner, Karen drove them back to Downs's house, and 
Misty left. (R. 185:252-53; see also 185:262-71 (reiterating what happened during the 
day; and stating "I honestly couldn't tell you the exact times")). 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, Downs maintained that the drugs found in 
the pants pocket at the jail did not belong to her. (See R. 184:162, 180). She wore pants 
that evening that Karen bought at Thrift Town. (R. 184:215, 228-30). Employees at 
Thrift Town did not search clothes before they placed them on the rack for resale. (R. 
184:218-19). Downs changed into the pants after "a cough attack" that caused her to soil 
her own clothes. (R. 185:251-52). She was wearing the Thrift Town pants when she was 
arrested later that night on outstanding misdemeanor warrants. (See R. 184:232). She 
did not know that methamphetamine was in the pocket. (See R. 184:162). When she 
arrived at the jail for processing, an officer discovered the baggie of drugs. (R. 184:157). 
Notwithstanding the evidence, the jury convicted Downs of possession of a 
controlled substance in a correctional facility. (R. 185:346). Downs has raised an 
evidentiary issue on appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Downs was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional 
facility. She was taken to the correctional facility after officers discovered that she had 
misdemeanor warrants outstanding for her arrest. At trial, over defense counsel's 
objections, the state presented evidence relating to execution of a search warrant at the 
house where Downs lived. The state also presented evidence that officers had conducted 
surveillance on the house for drug trafficking, and they found evidence of drugs at the 
house. Since Downs was charged with possession at a correctional facility, she maintains 
that evidence presented at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the 
house was unduly prejudicial. For that reason, Downs respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and remand this case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
THAT WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, 
A court may exclude unduly prejudicial evidence from admission at trial. Downs 
maintains that evidence presented at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity 
at the house was unduly prejudicial, confusing, and in violation of Rule 403. The trial 
court should have excluded the evidence here. 
A. THE UTAH RULES PROHIBIT THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
THAT IS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL. 
The analysis in this case begins with Rules 403 and 404, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 403 states the following: 
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (2007). The question of whether evidence is unduly prejudicial is 
"generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be upset on 
appeal absent manifest error." State inre R.D.S.* 111 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1989)), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 
(Utah 1990); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993) (stating an appellate court 
will determine whether admitting the evidence was "beyond the limits of reasonability") 
(cite omitted). 
Under the law, evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it confuses the jury, '"appeals to 
the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,' or 
otherwise 'may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established 
propositions in the case.'" State v. Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Carter v. Hewitt 611 F.2d 961, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980)); Diversified Holdings, 
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ^ f 38, 63 P.3d 686 (where evidence may have led to 
confusion, it was properly excluded); see also State v. KelU 2002 UT 106, \ 30, 61 P.3d 
1019 (citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988)); State v. Rammel 721 
P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) (excluding impeachment testimony where potential for pre-
judice substantially outweighed its probative value under the rule that preceded mle 403). 
In addition, "[w]hen applying rule 403, it is necessary to determine first whether 
the proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or 
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mislead the jury." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221. To that end, a court will balance the 
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of 
"scant or cumulative probative force" are not "dragged in by the heels for the sake of 
[their] prejudicial effect." Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1237 (quotation and cite omitted). 
In a criminal case, a court will apply a multi-factor balancing test to determine 
whether evidence - of prior bad acts or uncharged conduct - should be excluded at trial 
due to its prejudicial effect. Specifically, the court will consider [1] the strength of the 
evidence of uncharged conduct; [2] the similarities between the uncharged conduct and 
the conduct charged in the instant case; [3] the interval of time that has elapsed between 
the charged and uncharged conduct; [4] "the need for the evidence, [5] the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and [6] the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility." State v. Allen* 2005 UT 11, ^ 24, 108 P.3d 730 (referring to 
"these factors as the 'Shickles factors1"; and citing, inter alia, State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 832 (2005); State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 
UT 67, U 36, 52 P.3d 1194, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003); State v. Rees, 2004 UT 
App 51, U 5, 88 P.3d 359; State v. HolberU 2002 UT App 426, \ 32, 61 P.3d 291; State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
That analysis is relevant to this case: Downs maintains evidence presented at trial 
relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house was unduly prejudicial. 
In addition, Rule 404(b) is relevant here. According to that rule, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
10 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided 
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2007). 
The rule against improper use of character evidence works to ensure that a 
defendant is convicted because he committed the charged offense, and not because the 
jury is convinced that he is of bad character. See_ State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, *|] 31, 
80 P.3d 157, cert, denied. 90 P.3d 1040 (Utah 2004); U.S. v. Thomas. 632 F.2d 837, 845 
(10th Cir. 1980) (evidence that defendant committed similar acts is not admissible to 
prove defendant's guilt for the charged offense), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980). 
Utah courts have ruled that for admissibility under Rule 404(b), the court must 
examine the evidence to determine whether (1) it "is offered for a proper, noncharacter 
purpose, such as one of those listed in rule 404(b); (2) the evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 402; and (3) the evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." 
Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 16 (citing State v. Nelson-Wazzoner. 2000 UT 59, ffi[ 18-20, 6 P.3d 
1120; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ff 21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837). 
Under the three-part test for Rule 404(b), Downs maintains that evidence -
relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house - was inadmissible under the 
third prong. The evidence failed to meet the requirements of Rule 403. 
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B. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE SEARCH WARRANT AND DRUG 
ACTIVITY AT THE HOUSE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT 
TRIAL. 
In this case, the state charged Downs with possession of a controlled substance in 
a correctional facility. (R. 2-3; 103-04). According to the state's evidence, while Officer 
Pugh was booking Downs into the county jail on outstanding warrants, she discovered a 
baggie of controlled substance in Downs's pants pocket. (R. 184:157-58,170). Downs 
maintained that the drugs did not belong to her. (R. 184:162). 
Based on the charge at issue, the defense requested that the prosecutor be excluded 
from presenting evidence that officers executed a search warrant at Downs's home and 
discovered drug activity there. Defense counsel maintained that such evidence would be 
irrelevant to the charge for possession in a correctional facility and it would be unduly 
prejudicial and confusing. (R. 184:13-17). 
The trial court disagreed. It allowed the evidence under Rule 404(b) where it 
"goes directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it is absolutely relevant." 
(R. 184:18; see also id. at 184:18-19 (stating the evidence "goes to" lack of mistake)). 
The court also ruled that the evidence would not be unduly prejudicial or confusing, but 
rather, it would give "context to the jury." (R. 184:18-19). Those portions of the 
transcript reflecting the objection and ruling are attached hereto as Addendum C. 
As a result of the ruling, the prosecutor called several witnesses to present 
evidence relating to drug activity at the residence. Officer Shumway testified to an 
investigation leading up to the search warrant, execution of the search warrant, and items 
found in the house. She testified that prior to obtaining a search warrant for the 
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residence, she was able to purchase drugs on two occasions at the home with a 
confidential informant. (R. 184:115). Also, on about November 30, 2006, she was 
involved in executing a search warrant at Brian Stevens's home at 2965 South 700 East. 
(R. 184:115). Shumway identified several diagrams, and photographs relating to the 
residence and photographs of individuals inside the house when the warrant was 
executed. (R. 184:117-22). She identified documents with Stevens's and Downs's names 
on them. (R. 184:121,124). 
She described items found in the home including "a large tin box" filled with 
"multiple small plastic bags commonly used to distribute drugs" and a container of 
magnets used to store drugs and to hide them. (R. 184:121). She described a small black 
box with baggies, packages with methamphetamine, and large amounts of cash. (R. 
184:125-27). And she testified that officers found individuals in the home, including 
Downs, and they processed those individuals for warrants. (R. 184:129-30). 
Also, Officer Eatchel testified that while processing individuals at the home, he 
discovered warrants outstanding for Downs and he later transported her and other 
individuals from the home to the jail. (See R. 184:131, 166-67). In addition, criminalist 
Kevin Smith testified that he conducted tests on substances found at the house and he 
determined that the substances were methamphetamine. (R. 184:190-91). 
In this case, the prosecutor relied extensively on events at the residence in 
presenting his case to the jury. (See R. 185:313-17). The evidence of events at the home 
was excessive. It should have been excluded under Rule 403 and the Shickles factors. 
(See supra, page 10, herein, identifying the six Shickles factors); Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ 24. 
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Specifically, the first Shickles factor concerns "the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime." Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ f 24. In this case, the evidence 
concerning "the commission of the other crime" is the evidence relating to drug activity 
at the home. The strength of that evidence as it relates to Downs is weak. Indeed, 
Downs was not the focus of the search warrant or even a person of interest (R. 184:140-
42, 144); the state did not produce evidence that Downs committed a crime at the home. 
Downs was not cited for or even mentioned in connection with drug activity at the 
residence. (See, e.g.. R. 184:140-42, 144). 
The charge against Downs in this case related exclusively to drugs found in the 
jail. (See, e.g., 184:148 (stating that the drugs at issue in this case came from the jail)). 
In addition, officers transported Downs to the jail because of unrelated, outstanding 
misdemeanor warrants. (R. 184:167-68). Evidence that Downs committed a crime at the 
residence or engaged in criminal activity there was non-existent. (See R. 184:140-42, 
144; see also 184:139 (acknowledging that nothing connected Downs to the large 
amounts of money found at the house)). Based on the first factor, the trial court erred in 
allowing the state to present evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug 
activity at the home. 
The second Shickles factor concerns the similarities and circumstances surroun-
ding the events. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, \ 24 (stating the second factor considers "the 
similarities between the crimes"). In this case, the circumstances at the house had no real 
bearing on or similarities to the charge for possession at the correctional facility. Downs 
was not charged as a result of conduct at the residence (R. 184:140-42, 144); she was 
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charged for conduct at the jail. (R. 184:147-48 (stating drugs came from the jail)). 
In addition, the state's own evidence fails to support an actual link between 
circumstances at the residence and circumstances at the jail. Specifically, the state 
intended to use evidence relating to activities at the residence to tie the methamphelamine 
there to the methamphetamine found at the jail. (R. 184:14-15; see also R. 184:191 -92 
(comparing baggies found at the house to the baggie found in the jail)). Yet according to 
the state's evidence, items found in the home were "commonly used" for distributing 
drugs. (R. 184:121, 125-26, 140). There was nothing particularly unique about the 
items. In addition, there was nothing unique about the plastic baggie found at the jail in 
this case. (See id.\ see also R. 184:161 (Pugh did not recall any particular characteristic 
about the baggie found at the jail); 184:179 (Eatchel did not note any particular 
characteristic about the baggie found at the jail)). Any link between items at the house 
and the baggie at the jail was speculative at best. 
Furthermore, the criminalist who tested substances here stated that the plastic 
baggie found in the jail was not similar in size to plastic baggies found at the house. (See 
R. 184:197-98 (stating that although he is not an expert on pulling baggies from a box, 
the baggie found at the jail is smaller and he would not expect it to come from the same 
commercial box as the other baggies); see also R. 184:190-91, 196 (identifying 
differences between the amounts of substances found in the different baggies)). The only 
similarity in the baggies was color. (See R. 184:137 (indicating pink baggie found at the 
jail); 184:190-92 (comparing color of items found at the house and item found at the 
jail)). That similarity may be attributed to coincidence as much as anything else. 
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Also, there is no indication that state agents conducted any test to determine if the 
particular substance found at the jail was actually identical in terms of chemical com-
position to substances found at the house. (R. 184:197, 198). The criminalist testified 
that general appearances were similar and the substances could have come from the same 
source. (R. 184:196-97, 198). Without more, the circumstances at the house are not 
sufficiently similar to the circumstances at the jail to support probative value under Rule 
403. Based on the second factor, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present 
evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the home. 
The third Shickles factor is a timing element. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, % 24. It 
considers whether sufficient time has elapsed - between the act of uncharged conduct and 
the act of conduct charged in the case at hand - to weaken any link between the two acts. 
In this case, other intervening circumstances weaken the link between the conduct 
at the house and events at the jail. The intervening circumstances included the following: 
Officers were involved in events at the house focusing on Brian Stevens. (R. 184:143). 
The events there had no bearing on Downs; she was not a person of interest. (R. 184:141-
42, 145). Officers arrested Downs at the house for unrelated outstanding warrants. (See 
R. 184:167-68, 175). Eatchel then transported Downs to the jail where another officer, 
Pugh, discovered controlled substances. (R. 184:157-58, 170). Downs was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance in the jail. (R. 184:148 (recognizing drugs were 
found in the jail)). That is separate from events at the house. The facts support 
intervening circumstances. Based on the third factor, the trial court erred in allowing the 
state to present evidence relating to the search warrant and drugs at the home. 
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The fourth and fifth Shickles factors are related. They consider the need for the 
evidence and the efficacy of alternative proof. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, ffi[ 24, 32 
(identifying the fourth and fifth Shickles factors; ruling that the state "needed" the 
evidence in Allen's case to show conspiracy and it would have been "difficult" to 
establish conspiracy through alternative proof). Here, the state did not need evidence 
relating to events at the house. Specifically, the facts here show that Pugh discovered 
controlled substances in Downs's pocket after Downs arrived at the jail. (R. 184:157-58, 
170). The state then pursued a charge against Downs for possession in a correctional 
facility. (R. 2-3; 103-04). Since the charge concerned a controlled substance at the jail, 
the evidence relating to events at the house was unnecessary. 
Indeed, that evidence concerned a drug investigation against Brian Stevens, 
execution of a search warrant, and the discovery of controlled substances and items at the 
house. In this case, Downs was not cited for or even mentioned in connection with 
controlled substance activities at the residence. (See R. 184:141-43). Her charge related 
only to possession at the jail. (R. 184:148; 103-04). Based on the fourth and fifth 
factors, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence at trial relating to the 
search warrant and drug activity at the house. 
Finally, under the sixth Shickles factor, the evidence of events at the house served 
to confuse the jury, and it incited overmastering hostility in the jury. Evidence that 
Downs lived at a drug house was intended to unfairly appeal to jurors' sympathies, to 
arouse their sense of horror, to provoke their instinct to punish, and to create confusion to 
Downs's detriment. See infra, page 19, herein; State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that if evidence confuses the jury, appeals to it 
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, or provokes its instinct to punish, it may be 
unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible); Diversified Holdings. L.C.* 2002 UT 129, If 38 
(stating that evidence leading to confusion or speculation about what might have 
happened was properly excluded); State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995) 
(requiring a showing of "unusual probative value" if evidence has an unusually strong 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead a jury). The evidence was unduly 
prejudicial and confusing. 
Based on the Shickles factors, the trial court erred in allowing the state to present 
evidence at trial relating to the search warrant and drug activity at the house. The 
evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403. 
C. DOWNS WAS PREJUDICED BY THE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the prejudice standard for evidentiary 
error as follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." 
State v. RimmascK 175 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 
1122 (Utah 1989) (in assessing harm, the court will not apply the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard; "rather, it focuses on the taint caused by the error"). 
"In analyzing errors, we are guided by the fundamental principle that all the rules 
relating to the conduct of criminal trials are meant to provide a fair, reasonable and 
practical means of doing justice. Where the error is one in which the fundamental 
fairness of the procedure by which the result is reached is drawn into question so as to 
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cast doubt on the result, then reversal is warranted." State v. Lenaburg% 781 P.2d 432, 
436-37 (Utah 1989) (internal cites omitted), abrogated on other grounds as stated in 
State v. Deporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). 
In this case, the evidence concerning the search warrant and drugs at the house 
was misleading and confusing. Officers did not consider Downs to be part of the drug 
operations at the residence; and they did not charge or cite her for activities at the 
residence. (See R. 184:144). Nevertheless, evidence of drugs at the house would have 
provoked the jury to penalize Downs simply for being there. Indeed, the jury in this case 
likely convicted Downs without event considering her defense. 
Yet Downs presented a credible defense. She maintained that the drugs found at 
the jail were not hers. (R. 184:162, 180). They were already in the pants when she 
borrowed them from Karen that evening. Karen had just purchased the pants from Thrift 
Town. (R. 184:210, 215, 228-30). Employees at Thrift Town did not search clothing for 
items left in pockets. (R. 184:218-19). Thus, the drugs here were in the pants pocket 
when Karen purchased them, and they were still in the pocket when Downs wore the 
pants after she had an accident in her own clothes. (See R. 184:215-16, 228, 230 
(reflecting that Downs borrowed the pants)). The evidence reflected a credible defense. 
However, because the evidentiary error here was substantial and prejudicial, the jury 
likely disregarded it. 
That should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. Absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have given credence to Downs's 
defense and it would have reached Ma more favorable result." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
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546, 555 (Utah 1987). The jury likely would have acquitted Downs of the possession 
charge. This Court may reverse the conviction in this case due to the evidentiary error. 
See State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the jury may have 
reached a different result in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence); State v. 
Rammej 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986) (stating impeachment evidence should have 
been excluded as prejudicial). 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in this case may be readily resolved based on the record and established 
Utah law. See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Downs respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the conviction for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 3 r d day of Vecewber 2007. 
Linida M. Jones 
Patrick Tan 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CHARGES 
1. POSS C/S WITH IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/29/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS C/S WITH IN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
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Surcharge: $662.50 
Due: $1412.50 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
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Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 90 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1412.50 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
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Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages 
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Utah R. Evid- 403 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of 
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would 
be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory 
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances 
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case 
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same 
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
TabC 
\ j\&—0^-g<o 
> -
Itt THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAWN MARIE DOWNS, 
Defendant. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 061900114 FS 
(Volume I) 
Jury Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
March 28, 2007 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN 
Third District Court Judge 
FILES' PISTEBGT SOT 
Third Judicial Distrid 
AUG - 2 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
t 
Deputy Clerk 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Roger S. Blavlock 
SL COUNTY ATTORNEY 
111 E. Broadway #400 
SLC, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-7829 
Patrick S. Tan 
Melissa Fulkerson 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
424 E. 500 S. #300 
SLC, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84 606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
FILED 
H APPELLATE COURTIS 
AUG 3 i 200 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
for the attorneys ro do it then they will. For the bulk of the 
voir dire the Court conducts the questioning. 
Is there anything else that, we need ro address before we 
bring up the jury? 
MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. There is one pre-trial issue 
that we wanted the Court to make a ruling on before we proceed 
with rhe trial. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. 
MR. TAN: In regards to this case Ms. Downs was picked 
up at the location and transported to rhe jail because she had 
some outstanding justice court warrants. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TA.N: I believe they were they non-drug related. I 
believe that was established at the preliminary hearing. I 
actually think they were just traffic warrants. So she wasn't 
arrested at the scene for any of the drugs or drug paraphernalia 
at the house, but when she v/as booked into jail that's when the 
officer found that she had a baggie of alleged controlled 
substance in it and she was arrested because of that and charged 
with the sole count of possession of a controlled substance at a 
correctional facility. 
My understanding, talking to Mr. Blaylock this morning, 
is that the State is planning on introducing the bench war -- or 
the search warrant that was executed at the location and also 
bring in a lot of information that I don/t believe would be 
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THE COURT: All right. Was Ms. Downs listed on the 
search warrant as a party that would be present at the place 
being searched. Do --
MR. BLAYLOCK: She was not specifically listed; however, 
the search warrant says, "and search all persons present." 
THE COURT: Persons there. All right. Thank you. 
Response, Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, there are a number of facts 
that were determined at the scene that relate to her knowledge, 
lack of mistake and things of that nature. One of those 
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particular is that the controlled substances that were found were 
found packaged in a manner similar to the one in her pocket, the 
same color as the one found in her pocket. 
So I would suggest that it's important tha 
allowed to show, because intent is a critical issue 
there was no mistake and there was knowledge on her 
i fact, also that she lived at this location, that sh 
familiar with the other defendant who was charged \ 
other controlled substances that were found at the 
There's a bill that comes to that address 
in fact she does live there. As a matter of fact, 
of the officers she had no idea what was going on. 
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Well, I think 
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should have 
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claiming, "I knew nothing." 
THE COURT: Thank you. Further response? 
MR. TAN: And your Honor, if I may respond. 
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issue. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. TAN: Having done the prelim, I can address the 
First of all, as the Information states, she is charged 
with just one count, and the count is very specific. The State 
has amended it in regards to the location. It's not the 
residence, but it is the jail. 
The original Information yes, she was charged with being 
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There were obviously one co-defendant we know of; I 
believe there might be more. However, Ms. Downs was not cited 
or even mentioned to have any type of connection with any of 
the controlled substances within the residential area. She is 
charged with possession of a controlled substance at the jail. 
I believe that if the State was to allow or to be 
allowed to admit into evidence a search warrant and also any 
background information, then, that the State's witnesses will 
test_fy to, I think that's going to just confuse the jury. 
They're going to try to then link Ms. Downs, who was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance at the nail, with the fact 
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1 that there were other people charged at tne residential area 
2 instead. 
3 So I think, once again, it is highly prejudicial. I 
4 don't see any probative value involved. I think it also will 
5 comu^e the jury because they're going to think that she is 
6 charged with possession, and it is irrelevant if it's at the jail 
7 or at the residential area. If that's the eas^, once again we 
8 would ask the Court not to allow the State to amend it ro a 
9 second degree of possession at a correctional facility, because 
10 the jury is going to think, "Well, she's in possession. Maybe 
11 she had the drugs back at the residential place instead of the 
12 jail," then the Information is not correct. So we would make an 
13 argument on that, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. If you wish to 
15 respond. 
16 MR. BLAYLOCK: Just one other comment. My understanding 
17 from the individuals that the defense has called as witnesses is 
18 she has a very specific defense, and that is, "Those weren't my 
19 pants." So I think it's critical that the State be allowed to 
2 0 tie in the drugs that were found in the pants with the drugs that 
21 were found at the residence and with what was there to see at the 
22 residence and to know. 
2 3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any further response 
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Trie -- again, the 
issues are very appropriately addressed at this point, but I 
do find that the evidence of how the defendant possessed the 
methainphetamme, that the burden on the State is to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt her knowledge and intent into possessing the 
methamphetamine, and that is the first part of the charge. It is 
an element that the State must prove, and that this evidence goes 
directly to Ms. Downs' knowledge and intent; therefore, it JS 
absolutely relevant. 
Whether or not it is so prejudicial that that 
outweighs the relevance and would be unfair and unjust to allow 
that evidence in, I do not find that that is tne case. I think 
that this gives context to the jury. It is not confusing to 
them, that it actually gives them context, but that in order to 
prove any possession of a controlled substance the State has got 
to prove that Ms. Downs possessed the methamphetamine. 
Whether or not that is shown at the jail or at another 
place is not more prejudicial to Ms. Downs. It is not more 
prejudicial to Ms. Downs that she possessed it somewhere else. 
The same evidence of her possession is going to be coming in, 
and so the fact that it comes in in the context that it was at 
a search warrant at a residence where she was, and apparently 
there's some evidence that she resides there, goes directly to 
her knowledge and lack of mistake. So that goes specifically to 
the case -- the State's ability to enter this in its case in 
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Clearly if it is also the defense, and Ms. Downs has 
no responsibility to even provide any defense, but clearly if 
it does go to the defense, then -- then that information is 
appropriate there. But the first part of the ruling has got to 
be whether or not the State can even use it in their case in 
chief. I find that this is absolutely relevant to the State's 
element that they must prove this knowing possession, and that 
it -- the fact that the possession may have occurred somewhere 
besides the address and the correctional facility does not make 
it irrelevant to the case. 
The know -- anything that makes the possession more . 
knowing, more intentional, more likely than not is by definition 
relevant, and the prejudice just simply is not extensive at all. 
The only prejudice that goes to Ms. Downs is that she possessed 
an unlawfully -- an unlawful controlled substance. 
That is something that is going to have to be shown by 
the State or they're going to fail in the first element that they 
must prove. The fact that it was somewhere besides the second 
element that they must prove is not prejudicial to Ms. Downs. 
That's information that the jury and the fact finders are going 
to have to receive anyway. 
I am, however, going to make it be specific so that if 
there -- the cross examination may also allow that this was --
whether or not the search warrant was specifically to Ms. Downs. 
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That type of cross examination is appropriate as well. It 
doesn't look like there's any objection to this being why she was 
taken to the jail. They're not getting in the subject matter of 
the bench warrants for the justice courts. That doesn't seem to 
be necessary, and I don't get -- sense from either argument that 
6 there is any anticipation of the underlying warrants -- the 
7 nature of the underlying.warrants being admitted for any 4 04(b) 
8 I purposes. It's simply that Ms. Downs was arrested and taken to 
the jail. Is that what evidence the State is anticipating as far 
10 as any prior war -- bench warrants or convictions? 
11 MR. BLAYLOCK: Yes, your Honor. We weren't going to 
12 delve into the nature of the warrants. We were merely going to 
13 indicate that because that's the way that they normally do these 
14 kinds of search warrants, execute these search warrants. They 
15 put people in restraints. They then check on warrants and they 
16 found warrants outstanding for Ms. Downs, and she was taken into 
17 custody, arrested for that. 
18 THE COURT: And --
19 MR. TAN: And your Honor, I believe just so that there 
2 0 are no unexpected surprises when actually we have the jury before 
21 us, I think that I may very well on cross examination dive into 
2 2 that issue, because I think if in fact the Court will allow the 
2 3 search -warrant and some of the facts that transpired, at the 
2 4 residence to come in to testimony, I think it will be important 
2 5 for the jury to know that even though she was picked up on 
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warrants, these warrants were not drug related. They were not --
they were from Davis and South Salt Lake Justice Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TAN: These are minor traffic warrants. 
THE COURT: If the defense is bringing that in then 
6 it's not -- then it's not something that the Court needs to rule 
1 on. It's only if the State were anticipating bringing that in, 
3 so there won't be any restriction that way. Clearly any ruling 
9 on allowing in evidence for the State in its case of ch -- case 
10 in chief, the fairness issues go both ways, and full cross 
11 examination within the rules is appropriate on that. 
12 All right. Anything else that we need? 
13 MR. BLAYLOCK: Just one clarification. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. BLAYLOCK: As indicated, the State intends to have 
16 (inaudible) admitted into evidence. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. BLAYLOCK: Does the Court ruling allow for that? 
19 THE COURT: And have you seen the search warrant, 
20 Mr. Tan, so — 
21 MR. TAN: I (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: -- you can give any response to that? It 
23 has the address. It has the name, other information, is with my 
2 4 ruling, that that gives context to the arrest. Is there any 
9
 5 I objection to the search warrant itself actually being admitted? 
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1 MR. TAN: And your Honor, yes, we would be objecting to 
2 that being able to come in. I cam see the testimony -- relevant 
3 to the testimony as far as background information for the jury to 
4 K.now why the officers showed up at the residence to begin with, 
5 but to (inaudible) jury have a copy of that bench warrant, 1 
6 really don't see the purpose of that. They're not here to decide 
7 whether or not that the warrant v/as valid or if the officers had 
8 a right to be there. They're here to decide if Ms. Downs 
9 knowingly and intentionally had in her possession the controlled 
10 substance at the jail. 
11 THE COURT: And — 
12 MR. TAW: So I don't think it's going to --
13 THE COURT: What is the State's desired purpose in 
14 actually admitting the document itself? 
15 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, your Honor, in a way it's kind of a 
16 response to the comments from defense Counsel, and that was v/as 
17 this search warrant directed at the defendant, and that would 
18 show no, it wasn't. It was directed at Brian J. Stephens, and 
19 who else would be allowed to be searched at that time. It 
20 indicates that all persons who were in the house at the time 
21 (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Okay. I am going to now alio* the document 
2 3 itself to be admitted. I think that that does become confusing 
24 to the jury because the focus then becomes on the document. 
2 5 I Certainly those questions are appropriate, but for the jury to 
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actually be perusing the document itself when that is not at 
issue here and has not had legal rulings as far as I know on 
the language in the search warrant, the -- I'm allowing that 
information to get to the jury just to give it context of why 
it was there. That can be done through oral testimony and 
6 questioning. So the objection to the search warrant itself 
7 I being admitted, at least at this point, seems to be well taken. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, would it be possible to admit 
9 the search warrant and not the affidavit? 
10 THE COURT: Do you want to look at that? I think the 
11 same reasons -- the same objections. It's the documentation 
12 that I think runs the risk of giving more ere -- I don't know 
13 that it's credibility, just that a jury may give it more weight 
14 simply because it is a document itself and because that is not 
15 v/hat it at issue in the knowing and intentional possession here 
16 in this case today. No. At this time I'm sustaining the 
17 objections that the documents themselves be admitted. 
18 MR. BLAYLOCK: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further that 
2 0 need to discuss? All right. 
21 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, there is one other issue. 
2 2 I THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: This Court was adjourned for two weeks so 
2 4 I that we could interview witnesses that Counsel --
THE COURT: Okay. 
